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Visual attention is attracted by salient stimuli that
‘pop out’ from their surroundings. Attention can also
be voluntarily directed to objects of current impor-
tance to the observer. What happens in the brain
when these two processes interact?
To mangle a well-known Wordsworth line, the world is
too much for us — it contains far too much informa-
tion for us to perceive at once. We typically pay
attention to individual items, one after another. But
which items? That depends on two distinct types of
attentional mechanism. Bottom-up mechanisms are
thought to operate on raw sensory input, rapidly and
involuntarily shifting attention to salient visual features
of potential importance — the spot of red against a
field of green that could be a piece of fruit, the sudden
movement that could be a predator. Top-down
mechanisms implement our longer-term cognitive
strategies, biasing attention toward colored spots if
we are hungry or toward sudden movements and
quadrupedal shapes if we fear a predator.
Psychologists have investigated how these two
attentional processes function in human perception,
both individually and — as is usual under natural
conditions — together [1]. In a typical experiment [2],
on some trials subjects were asked to search for and
identify a color singleton, such as a single red target in
a search display containing several white distractor
stimuli, while on other trials the target was an onset
singleton — the only item in the display with an abrupt
onset. The search display was immediately preceded
by a ‘cue’ display, also containing a color or onset sin-
gleton. Even though subjects were instructed that the
preceding cue display was irrelevant and should be
ignored, the cue singleton attracted attention in an
involuntary, bottom-up fashion, affecting how quickly
subjects could respond to the upcoming targets. 
When a color-singleton cue appeared at the same
location as the upcoming color target, for example,
attention was drawn to the target location in advance
and responses were faster. When a color-singleton
cue appeared at a different location, attention was
temporarily drawn away from the target location and
responses were slower. However, this bottom-up
attention effect was modulated by the subject’s top-
down attentional state: color-singleton cues only
affected response times when the subject was
searching for a color target; likewise, onset-singleton
cues only mattered during search for onset targets.
Thus, bottom-up attention alerts us to salient items in
our environment, but top-down attention modulates
bottom-up signals when we need to look for some-
thing specific.
A new paper by Ogawa and Komatsu [3] provides a
glimpse at the neural processes underlying such
interactions between bottom-up and top-down
attention. These investigators trained monkeys on two
top-down behavioral strategies: color-singleton search
and shape-singleton search. The search displays
(Figure 1, red and green boxes) always contained six
stimuli, including one color singleton and one shape
singleton. At the beginning of the trial, the monkey had
to fix its gaze at the center of the screen. Then the
display appeared, and the monkey had to saccade
(shift its gaze; arrows in Figure 1) to the correct target
to receive a reward. In the color search task (the two
boxes on the right), the correct target was the color
singleton; in the shape search task (left-hand boxes)
the correct target was the shape singleton. 
While the monkey performed these tasks, Ogawa
and Komatsu [3] recorded the electrical spike activity
of individual neurons in area V4, an intermediate stage
in the visual object-processing pathway of the brain,
where neural activity is known to be affected by
attention [4–8]. The display was arranged so that one
stimulus fell inside the V4 neuron’s receptive field
(gray circles in Figure 1). On a given trial, the receptive
field stimulus could be the shape singleton (red boxes
in Figure 1), the color singleton (green boxes) or one of
the four non-singleton stimuli (not shown). Depending
on the search condition, a receptive field singleton
stimulus could either be a target (solid outline boxes)
or a non-target (dashed outline boxes).
The firing rate versus time plots in Figure 1 show
how an example V4 neuron responded to a white
cross-shaped stimulus during shape search (left) and
color search (right). In both conditions, this neuron’s
response to the white cross was stronger when that
stimulus was the color singleton in the display (green
lines). The color-singleton responses began to
exceed the shape-singleton (red) and non-singleton
(blue) responses at about 125 milliseconds after stim-
ulus onset. Other neurons showed similar response
enhancements for color singletons, shape singletons
or both, again under both search conditions. Thus,
even when the top-down strategy was to focus on
one dimension (shape or color), singletons in the
other dimension evoked enhanced responses from
some neurons.
This obligatory singleton effect at the neural level is
neatly consistent with psychophysical evidence
reported by Theeuwes [9]. He showed that, during
searches for shape-singleton targets, the attention of
human observers is ineluctably drawn to irrelevant
color singletons. This psychophysical effect now has
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a neural analog: the neural response enhancement for
color singletons that occurs even during shape search
(Figure 1). Response enhancement is the signature for
attention at the neural level [4–8], and it is easy to
imagine that the enhanced responses to singletons
could cause (or in a sense constitute) the bottom-up
attentional capture observed in humans.
Citing his psychophysical evidence, Theeuwes [10]
has maintained that bottom-up attention, for example
to singletons, can never be overridden by top-down
attention. Do the neurophysiological results of Ogawa
and Komatsu [3] support this categorical position?
Not necessarily. First, in both the psychophysical
experiments of Theeuwes [9] and neurophysiological
experiments of Ogawa and Komatsu [3], the task itself
requires search for singletons (in a particular dimen-
sion). Subjects are deliberately looking for unique
stimuli that pop out from a field of distractors — a top-
down cognitive mode that might permit any singleton
to capture bottom-up attention. What if the search
target is not a singleton? Bacon and Egeth [11] tested
this by requiring search for a specific shape
embedded in an array of multiple shapes, rendering
the target a non-singleton and discouraging a single-
ton search strategy. Under this circumstance, color-
singleton distractors had no apparent effect,
indicating that bottom-up effects can be overridden in
some cases. It would be fascinating to know whether
the neural singleton effect would likewise disappear
under non-singleton search conditions.
Second, while the neural singleton effect is not
completely overridden by top-down strategy in the
Ogawa and Komatsu [3] experiment, it is nevertheless
strongly modulated, especially at later timepoints.
The response to the irrelevant color singleton (during
shape search; Figure 1, dashed green line) falls to
near 20 spikes per second by 200 milliseconds after
display onset, while the relevant (color search) color-
singleton response (solid green line) stays up near
50 spikes per second. Thus, the enhancement of
neural responses to color singletons is stronger
during color search and weaker during shape search.
Most neurons showed similar task-dependent
response differences. This could be a general effect
of compatibility between search dimension and sin-
gleton type, or it could represent selective enhance-
ment of responses to the target stimulus once it has
been identified. In either case, it exemplifies top-
down modulation of bottom-up effects, consistent
with theories and psychophysical evidence favoring
the idea that top-down and bottom-up factors inter-
act to control allocation of attention [1,2,11–15]. 
The differential time course of the bottom-up and
top-down neural effects provides a particularly reveal-
ing comparison with psychophysics. In Figure 1, the
color-singleton response functions (green lines) begin
to separate from shape-singleton (red) and distractor
(blue) responses at about 125 milliseconds (in both
shape search and color search). The additional top-
down effect of search dimension begins to appear at
about 175 milliseconds (where the dashed green line
continues to fall but the solid green line stays high). At
the neural population level, bottom-up singleton
response enhancement first became significant at
about 120 milliseconds, while top-down search
dimension effects first became significant at about
195 milliseconds [3].
A similar time course difference has been
demonstrated in human psychophysical experiments
[13,14]. Figure 2 is based on an experiment by Lamy
et al. [14] in which the primary task was to report the
presence or absence of a circle target among square
distractors (a shape task). In every trial, one of the
square distractors was a task-irrelevant color single-
ton designed to attract bottom-up attention. The
allocation of attention was tested at different time
points with a concurrent secondary task: a small
probe dot could appear at one of the square/circle
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Figure 1. Responses of a typical monkey area V4 neuron
during the shape search and color search tasks. 
The left and right plots show the neuron’s firing rate as a
function of time following display onset. The center boxes show
four different task conditions. See text for details.
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Figure 2. Probe reaction time as a
function of delay between target display
and probe.
The graph on the left shows the response
times of human subjects to probe stimuli
presented at the location of a shape
target (circles, solid lines) or a color sin-
gleton (squares, dashed lines) at two dif-
ferent probe delays (time between display
onset and probe onset). The vertical
response time scale is inverted so that
faster responses appear higher. See text
for details.
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stimulus locations, and the subject had to respond to
the probe dot by pressing a key as quickly as possi-
ble. (Later, at the end of the trial, the subject reported
whether the circle target had been present.) At an
early time point — tested with a probe delay of just
60 milliseconds following display onset — subjects
responded faster to the probe at the color-singleton
location, showing that this irrelevant singleton had
captured attention in a bottom-up fashion. 
At a later time point — 150 milliseconds probe delay
— subjects responded faster to the probe at the
shape-target location, showing that top-down
attention had taken over. Thus, at both the neural and
psychophysical levels, bottom-up attention acts early,
and top-down attention takes over within on the order
of 100 milliseconds. These parallel time courses help
to confirm the functional relationship between the
neural events and the behavioral performance
measurements. The earlier time course for bottom-up
attention makes sense — salience effects based on
simple visual properties could be rapidly implemented
at early visual processing stages, while top-down
cognitive control would require subsequent
operations on sensory input by higher-level cortex.
Psychology has shown that the complex dynamic
interplay between bottom-up and top-down attention
determines what we are aware of from moment to
moment [1,2,11–15]. Ogawa and Komatsu [3] have
provided the closest look yet at this interplay on the
neural level. Parallels are often drawn between
neural and psychological events, but it is rare to see
a neurophysiological paradigm so well-targeted
toward an extensive preexisting set of psychophysi-
cal observations. One hopes this is the beginning of
a closer interaction between the two literatures that
will lead to a far richer understanding of visual atten-
tion in all its complexity.
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